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1. Introduction
The substantive evolution of EU competition law is characterised by 
numerous instances of inconsistencies. An analysis of the substantive 
impact of the institutional features of the EU competition law system con-
tributes to explain some of these peculiarities. This is the main argument 
developed by Pablo Ibáñez Colomo in The Shaping of EU Competition Law, 
an empirically-driven work in which the Author succeeds in providing 
convincing explanations to some of the discipline’s idiosyncrasies.
In the book, the Author provides an extensive analysis of both the case-
law and the administrative practice related to the interpretation of three 
key notions of EU competition law, considering first the institutional con-
text in which each notion has been fleshed out and second the evolution in 
the interpretation of each notion in light of the behaviour of the European 
Commission (hereinafter the “Commission”) and of the EU courts. 
This choice of methodology contributes to make this work an innovative 
and original input to the discipline’s literature, presenting new perspec-
tives on the EU competition law system as a whole and offering food for 
thought on future discussions about the institutional structure sustaining 
this field of EU law.
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2. Book chapters
The book is divided into 3 parts (Theory, Analysis and Implications) and 
7 chapters. In Part I, the Author introduces the research topic and estab-
lishes an analytical framework for the study of the EU competition law 
system. In Part II, the Author conducts an analysis of some key notions of 
substantive EU competition law, and, finally, in Part III, before conclud-
ing the study, the Author considers the implications of the analysis for the 
understanding of the substantive development of EU competition law.
In the first (introductory) chapter, the Author draws out his research 
topic, hinting as to how the patterns of behaviour of the Commission and 
the EU courts might influence the evolution of the interpretation of cer-
tain provisions of EU competition law. To understand such developments, 
it is necessary to consider how the Commission shapes its interpretation 
of said provisions and how EU courts engage (if the procedural framework 
enables it) with the choices made by that administrative authority. The 
Author promises to carry out (and essentially delivers) this analysis in an 
agnostic fashion, without any normative claims on the direction in which 
EU competition law or policy should develop. 
Three fundamental notions which define the boundaries of the relative 
provisions are chosen as case studies for this inquiry: the notion of restric-
tion of competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU, the notion 
of abuse under Article 102 TFEU and the substantive criterion against 
which mergers are assessed. A comprehensive approach covering a mean-
ingful universe of cases is deemed necessary to draw reasoned conclu-
sions and contributes to make this work an empirically-driven one, solidly 
established on extensive data.
The second chapter sets out a specific analytical framework for the study 
of the EU competition law system. As the Author explains, this field of 
EU Law is built on top of open-textured concepts, a feature enabling the 
occurrence of inconsistencies in the interpretation of some of its most 
central provisions and creating challenges for its administrability as well. 
“Static” inconsistency, unlike “dynamic (or intertemporal)” inconsistency, 
is not the somewhat inevitable (and to an extent desirable) by-product of 
an ever-evolving field of law, but a permanent issue, sometimes reveal-
ing itself across provisions, determining different results for similar fac-
tual situations. If one considers rebates, for instance, it may seem strange 
how standardised rebates and target rebates are treated differently by EU 
courts. As noticed by the Author later in the book, “the difference between 
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these schemes is not one of principle, but of degree”, raising the question 
as to why EU courts have developed two distinct analytical frameworks for 
this type of practice.
As the Author points out, it is not only important to determine whether 
inconsistencies exist, but whether there are factors contributing to the 
development and the perpetuation of such inconsistencies. Prosecutorial 
bias and judicial deference may sustain inconsistencies since the erratic 
action of the biased administrative authority will not be subject to suf-
ficient judicial review. Claims of prosecutorial bias and judicial deference 
are accordingly at the centre of the discussion on the interplay between the 
institutional and substantive dimensions of EU competition law and will 
be successfully tested throughout the study. 
The third chapter, the first of Part II, examines the notion of restric-
tion of competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU. The elu-
sive concepts of “by object” and “by effect” restrictions are at the heart of 
this analysis, where the Author, after considering the institutional context 
underpinning this provision, carries out an analysis of different types of 
Article 101(1) TFEU cases. Empirical findings reveal important insights on 
the substantive evolution of this provision. It becomes clear, for instance, 
how the substantive content of Article 101(1) TFEU was essentially shaped 
by the Court in preliminary ruling proceedings. Indeed, core Article 
101(1) TFEU principles were defined very early on in cases such as Société 
Technique Minière, pre-empting the Commission’s creativity. Moreover, 
far more cases concerning the notion of restriction of competition came 
before the Luxembourg judges via Article 267 TFEU than through Article 
263 TFEU. 
Further in the analysis, it is explained how post-Regulation 1/2003 “by 
effect” cases became a rarity, something explained by a conscious option 
of the Commission in privileging (easier) “fact-intensive” cases combined 
with a frequent use of commitment decisions. In the context of Article 
101(1) TFEU, “fact-intensive” cases are cases where the legal framing as 
a “by object” restriction is relatively uncontested. The data gathered and 
processed by the Author shows that cartel cases represent 85 per cent of 
the decisions adopted in this period, where the majority of the other 15 
per cent relate to clear-cut infringements, Cartes Bancaires standing as 
the most noticeable exception. Commitment decisions, on the other hand, 
became an intuitive solution for the Commission in (harder) “law-inten-
sive” cases where the legal framing is less clear and recourse to informal 
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and/or negotiated solutions becomes a desirable outcome. Indeed, as the 
Author points out, if we consider vertical restraints, “law-intensive” prac-
tices par excellence, it is perceivable how these conducts have been essen-
tially dealt with through soft law instruments such as guidelines. 
The fourth chapter considers the notion of abuse within the meaning 
of Article 102 TFEU, the second concept analysed in Part II. Following 
the same methodology as in the previous chapter, the Author finds that, 
unlike Article 101(1) TFEU, the substantive tone of Article 102 TFEU was 
set by the Commission essentially in the context of annulment proceed-
ings. Statistically, Article 102 TFEU prohibition decisions are prone to be 
challenged in annulment proceedings, with 73 per cent of them follow-
ing the route of Article 263 TFEU. This is not surprising considering how 
Article 102 TFEU practices hardly constitute clear-cut “fact-intensive” 
infringements. Furthermore, until Regulation 1/2003, the Commission 
was limited, at least formally, in its enforcement options, trapped in a two-
fold choice between prohibiting the practice and closing the file, a factor 
which contributed to a higher proportion of annulment proceedings. 
The central role of the Commission in annulment proceedings resulted 
in noticeable substantive implications, namely considering what the 
Author dubbed as the “gravity effect” of the Commission’s presence for 
the interpretative results of EU courts. Very interestingly, this explains, for 
instance, why Article 102 TFEU cases such as predatory pricing, exclusive 
dealing and “margin squeeze” cases were originally framed as “fact-inten-
sive” ones, subject to reduced evidentiary standards and founded on rela-
tively thin legal analysis. This did not mean however that the Commission 
succeeded in pushing forward expansive interpretations of Article 102 
TFEU in each of its attempts. Indeed, as explained by the Author, if we 
consider predatory pricing, it is possible to notice that while in its decision 
in AKZO the Commission did not focus on the anti-competitive effects of 
that practice, the Court raised the substantive threshold, demanding some 
evidence of the capability of the conduct in driving equally efficient com-
petitors out of the market. This constitutes one example of the absence of 
judicial deference in EU competition law, a claim progressively refuted by 
the Author throughout the book.
Concluding Part II of the book, the fifth chapter examines the work’s last 
case-study: the substantive criterion against which mergers are assessed 
both under Regulation 4064/89 as well as under Regulation 139/2004. 
An analysis of the institutional context underpinning EU merger control 
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starts by revealing, unsurprisingly, the virtual irrelevance of preliminary 
references in the interpretation of these instruments. Focusing on Phase II 
decisions that were eventually challenged, the Author comes to the con-
clusion that a considerable amount of these decisions were annulled for 
reasons relating to the application of the substantive criterion, with EU 
courts often reframing the Commission’s approach. This was the case, for 
instance, in Tetra Laval/Sidel, where EU courts departed from the analyti-
cal framework originally proposed by the Commission for conglomerate 
mergers and annulled its decision, yet another example of meaningful judi-
cial oversight over that administrative authority’s interpretative choices. 
Introducing Part III of the book, the sixth chapter, titled “The Shaping 
of EU Competition Law: Past and Prospects”, explains the study’s main 
findings, considering first the behaviour of the Commission and second 
that of the EU courts. From the three “analytical” chapters of the book, the 
Author extracts one main lesson regarding the decision-making practice 
of the Commission: this competition authority has consistently pursued 
the interpretation of EU competition law leading to the expansion of its 
powers. This is true for what is referred to as “one-shot interactions” as 
well as for “repeated interactions”, the first meaning the crafting of legal 
tests and the second the engagement with the EU courts’ case-law. Indeed, 
the Author’s findings point in the sense that when crafting legal tests the 
Commission tends to design the scope of prima facie prohibitions in an 
unstructured and expansive manner, while opting for an expansive or nar-
row reading of the EU courts’ rulings depending on their impact on the 
boundaries of its powers. This pattern of behaviour can be identified hori-
zontally, across Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, as well as in merger control, and 
is consistent, for instance, with the Commission’s reluctance in embracing 
economic analysis, what the Author describes as a type of “exogenous con-
straint” limiting the authority’s freedom in defining its powers. 
A changing institutional landscape creates new opportunities for the 
Commission’s expansionist efforts, as an analysis of the introduction of 
commitment decisions seems to suggest. As the Author points out, this 
instrument allows for the Commission to deviate from established prec-
edents as well as to design legal tests without being subject to any judicial 
counterweigh. This fosters the appearance of certain aberrations in sub-
stantive EU competition law as it is arguably the case of the ENI decision, 
where a firm’s “strategic underinvestment” was qualified as an unlawful 
refusal to supply in contradiction with established case-law on this type 
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of abuse of dominance. Indeed, from considering that a refusal to allow 
access to a given infrastructure may exceptionally be prohibited to finding 
that a refusal to invest in new capacity is equally unlawful goes quite an 
intellectual jump. 
Another institutional mutation considered by the Author, the decen-
tralisation in the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, is found capa-
ble of shifting/consolidating the centre of gravity of judicial law-making 
on preliminary reference proceedings. In this context, the Commission’s 
prerogative to make submissions to the Court may well become its main 
persuasive instrument before the Luxembourg judges. Because of this, it 
would be, in my opinion, desirable for the Court to reconsider its rela-
tively restrictive stance on transparency in access to documents related to 
EU courts’ proceedings, as established in Commission v. Breyer, in view of 
enabling an effective control over the Commission’s behaviour. This effort 
was undertaken by the Author, who gaining access to the Commission’s 
submissions in TeliaSonera reached the conclusion that, in that proceed-
ing, the authority pleaded in favour of an interpretation of Article 102 
TFEU, on the issue of “margin squeeze” practices, different from what it 
had established in soft law instruments. This type of conduct, in my view, 
hurts the Commission’s legitimacy, revealing an incoherent administra-
tive action close to arbitrariness. 
Turning to the behaviour of the EU courts, the Author definitely refutes 
the curial deference discourse, progressively disproved throughout the 
book. Indeed, the figures examined in this study confirm a willingness 
of the EU courts both in effectively engaging with the analysis made by 
the Commission as well as in quashing this authority’s decisions. There is, 
however, variation in EU courts’ attitude towards the Commission’s inter-
pretation of the law, something explained by the path-dependant nature of 
the EU judiciary. Indeed, choices made early on, especially in the context 
of preliminary references, tend to be reiterated later in time. Variations in 
the case-law are more likely to be caused by the already mentioned “gravity 
effect” of the Commission’s presence, essentially in annulment proceed-
ings. EU courts show willingness to face existing substantive inconsist-
encies but on a case-by-case basis, without major “revolutions” in their 
case-law, something which does not come as a surprise considering how 
stability is valued in Luxembourg.
Chapter 7 concludes the book with the Author presenting some final 
thoughts on his research. On the issue of the substantive inconsistencies 
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which have emerged in EU competition law, a conclusion is reached in the 
sense that these peculiarities are fuelled by the behaviour of an adminis-
trative authority, the Commission, often acting in view of expanding its 
powers, combined with varying intensities of judicial oversight over that 
authority’s choices. Furthermore, the structure of EU competition law 
enforcement may, in some instances, aggravate these inconsistencies, as in 
the case of commitment decisions which, by design, are left unchecked by 
the EU judiciary. After setting “an agenda for future research”, the Author 
concludes the book by reminding the reader that this work is also a study 
in administrative law, with some of its methods and teachings capable of 
being transposed into other contexts involving administrative action and 
administrative justice.
3. Conclusion
Consistency constitutes a (if not the) fundamental building block of legal 
certainty, a quality any legal system should strive to develop and preserve. 
A legal system such as the EU’s competition law system, built on top of 
open-textured concepts, centred on an often opportunistic administra-
tive authority, is, as demonstrated throughout this monograph, one under 
structural risks of developing substantive inconsistencies. 
This book identifies these risks, calling the attention of the legal com-
munity to some very interesting tendencies in the institutional behaviour 
of the Commission and EU courts. It does so in an almost encyclopaedical 
style, covering the Author’s view on virtually all main judicial and admin-
istrative landmarks of the field, in a “law in context” framework, produc-
ing innovative and much-needed insights for the discipline.
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